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Does Market Upgrading Benet Farmers? :
Market Dierentiation, Contract Farming, and Professional
Cooperatives in
China's Pork Processing Industry 
Mariko Watanabey.
August 9, 2016
Abstract
This study tested whether contract farming or farmers profeccional cooperatives
(FPCs) improved the social benet of pork production and income of breeding farmers
in China. The main concern of this study is whether institutional arrangement like
contract farming or FPCs actually improved the welfare of farmers as expected. To
answer this question accurately, we estimated the dierentiated market demand of pork
products in order to quantify the benet by transaction types. Our study nds that
contract farming or FPCs improved the benets of pork products, but farmer's income
remained lower than that of traditional tranaction types. This nding is new in terms
of quantifying distribution of the economic values among sales outles, agro-rms and
farmers. It is more reliable because it explicitly captures impacts from both demand
side and supply side by structural estimation. In practice, we need to keep it mind the
bargaining power of small farmers will not improve instantly even when the contract
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1 Introduction
This study attempts to establish whether market dierentiation benets farmers. Whether
dierentiation and upgrading of the market benets farmer is a classical and important
problem in the literature.This study contributes to this eld by extending empirical analysis
to capture the structure of demand.
In order to protect the interest of farmers and raise their income, farmers' professional
cooperatives (FPCs) have been promoted by the Chinese government. In additon, the World
Bank has cooperated to develope the design of the institution (World Bank, 2006: Xu et.al
2013). Theoretically, securing the rights of farmers and integrating their transactions might
strengthen farmers' bargaining power on transactions and is expected to improve their
income and production. Does this really occur in China?
Substantial volumes of eldwork and surveys on the impact of FPCs have accumulated
( Zhang, 2001: Guo, 2005: Han, ed. 2007: Ikegami et.al 2009: Zhao and Yuan, 2014). The
case studies and surveys essentially report favorable results on FPCs in which collaboration
between rms and farmers generates win-win relationships. Cooperative membership raised
the icome of apple farmers in China. This is conrmed by an endogenous switching regres-
sion model (Ma and Awudu, 2016). A case study on the internal management mechanism
of FPCs in Hebei Province implies that FPCs are induced to rationalize resource allocation
in the village studies. This could imply that FPCs improve the eciency and value of
transactions (Yamada, 2016).
Contract farming is another institutional arrangement expected to enhance the bargaing
power of farmers. Contract farming prevails through the initiatives of agro-industry rms.
This arrangement exists to improve quality or procurement certainty for rms' production.
In addition, it presumably improves the bargaining power of farmers and improves the value
of agro-products. Furthermore, it enhances the benets of trade and improves the income of
farmers and the prots of rms (Miyata, 2009: Abebe et.al, 2013). Due to lack of eective
public enforcement mechanisms, contract fulllment is substantially aected by types of
private enforcement mechanism between rms and farmers. Agro-rms are cautious about
opportunistic behavior of farmers in China (Guo and Jolly, 2008). This environment may
substantially aect bargning power between rms and farmers in China.
The pork-processing industry in China experienced a drastic structural change in the
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mid 2000s mainly due to shortage of rural labor. Farmers preferred working in the non-
agricultural sector in urban area over breeding hogs in backyards. The industry underwent a
shift from backyard hog farms to intensive commercialized farm alongside with rapid growth
in production volumes and specialization. At the same time, the costs for environmental
protection of the industry increased drasctically (Zhao and Han 2014 : Jia 2012). Chinese
Academy of Agricultural Science (CAAS) surveys, which this study use, also captures a
drastic entry and exit numbers as described in Appendix A.
This study aims to quantitatively capture the distribtion of prot between rms and
farmers. We rst estimate consumer welfare by types of transaction, such as contract
farming or FPCs, and then, we statistically tests whether the institutions improved the
welfare of farmers. We nd that contract farming and FPCs improved economic value of
transaction, but do not raise the income of farmers. The approach we employ enables us to
capture the whole distribution of the value among the participants of the value chain, that
is, rms, consumers and farmers. The case studies or descriptive statistics analysis cannot
depict the whole picture of the value distribution. Our approach can complement previous
studies' ndings.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the framework and
estimation procedure. Section 4 reports the results of demand function estimation and
detailed descriptive statistics on the estimated values of transaction and their distribution,
such as consumer surplus, benets, price cost margin, and costs. Section 5 reports results
of statistical test for whether the new transaction institution, such as contract farming or
FPCs, contributes to increasing the income of farmers. Section 6 concludes.
2 Research Strategy
2.1 Estimation of Dierentiated Market Structure
This study aims to identify whether upgrading of China's pork market has progressed,
whether the upgrading generates higher economic value of transaction and whether this
value is distributed to farmers too. In addressing these research problems, we need to
quantify the utility of the pork produced and sold, as well as price and cost. Once the data
are obtained on the product's utility, benets or willingness to pay, the value of transaction,
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and distribution of the value along value chain can be quantied.
V alue of transaction = Bconsumerproduct   Pproduct + Pproduct   Cproduct (1)
Here, Bconsumerproduct  Pproduct represents a fraction of value that distributed to the consumer,
whereas Pproduct   Cproduct belongs to the suppliers. This empirical study attempts to
quantify the value of transaction in in China's Jilin and Henan provinces pork markets and
then tests the impact of contract farming or FPCs on their value.
2.1.1 Model for demand estimation
To estimate Bconsumerproduct in equation (1), we follow Berry(1994) and the Berry-Levinson-
Pakes (BLP) literature of the estimation of a dierentiated market. Details of the model
are developed in Appendix B. Here, we provide a simple description of the basic estimation
idea.
Assume a consumer has a choice to buy pork from rm A or rm B. The consumer will
buy pork from rm A when his or her utility of rm A's products is higher than the product
of rm B: otherwise, he or she would not buy it, denoted as \Not buy." The utility of pork
from rm A can be described as follows:
uA =  ipA + XA + error  uB  uNotbuy
If we further assume that the probability of buying pork from rm A follows logit forms.
Then,
ProbBuyA =
exp( ipA + XA + error)
exp(UA) + exp(UB) + exp(UNotbuy)
An point of assumption taken from Berry(1994) is that the probability of buying pork
from rm A is equal to the market share of pork A, sA , where the denominator includes
the share of potential buyers, not only actual buyers.
Under these assumptions, market share sA can be described as follows:
sA =
Sales quantity of product A
Sales quantity of product A+ Sales quantity of product B + Potential demand
=
exp( ipA + XA + error)
exp(UA) + exp(UB) + exp(UNotbuy)
(2)
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Here, another wise treatment of the BLP procedure is to assume UNotbuy = 0. If this
holds, exp(UNotbuy) becomes exp(0) = 1 and exploits its nature. Under this assumption,
the market share of "Not buy" becomes
sNotbuy =
exp(0)
exp(UA) + exp(UB) + exp(UNotbuy)
=
1
exp(UA) + exp(UB) + exp(UNotbuy)
: (3)
Combining equations (2) and (3) yeilds the following relationship.
sA
sNotbuy
= exp( ipA + XA + error):
Taking the logarithm of this equation, this becomes;
ln(sA)  ln(sNotbuy) =  ipA + XA + error: (4)
This is the estimation equation of the demand function in this study. The consumer
surplus of pork from rm A can be derived from the right-hand side of equation (3)
CSA =
 ipA + XA
i
The consumer surplus, benets and price from rm pork A have the following relation-
ship.
CSA = B
consumer
A   PA1 (5)
2.1.2 Empirical Procedure
The empirical procedure of this study is as follows. First, we dene the markets so as to
set the total market size. We set the boundary of a prefectural-level city as the unit of the
market.2
In the second step, we assume \potential total demand"is population multiplied by 10
kg. Actual per capita consumption of pork of the whole nation in 2012 was 5 kg; however,
1For simplicity of description, we assume there is only one consumer in the market. In the real world, the
consumer surplus of pork from rm A is the sum of the benets of pork from rm A to those who actually
choose it.
2The CAAS surveys have information about location of customers, according to the types of sales outlet.
However, we do not fully utilize this information in this study. Extension and elaboration of this market
denition will be a challenge for a future study.
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European consumed 10kg per capita in the same year, and thus, we employ 10 kg as the
potential consumption demand.
In the third step, we dene independent variables in the estimation equation. A survey
of CAAS whose data we use in this study, has information of each transaction with several
types of sales outlets and procurement sources including price, quantity and characteristics
of products. We use these transactions as the unit of observation. We obtain quantity (kg)
and price (RMB/kg) and compute each product's market share. Then, we compute the
share of \Not buy" by potential market consumption minus the total quantity of pork sold
by the surveyed rms in respective markets.
The fourth step is the estimation. We estimated the demand parameters using gen-
eralized method of moment (GMM) procedures. Identication is an important topic, We
provide details in the following Subsection 2.1.3.
The demand function takes a nested logit form, which is described in equation (15). As
 is close to 1, it implies that the market is more closed to complete homogenization. Here,
we can compute the consumer surplus and benets of each transaction's products.
The fth step is to compute price elasticities and price cost margin. Once the demand
function parameters are obtained, particularly, the coecient i on price in equation (3),
we can derive the own price elasticity of product j and the cross price elasticity between
products j and k from logit demand form as the following relationship:
own price elasticity = i  pricej  (1  sharej)
cross price elasticity =  i  sharej  sharek
The (marginal) cost is computed from the equation: pjt mcjt =  qjt:@pjt@qjt where
@pjt
@qjt
qjt
pjt
is
the estimated price elasticities.
The seventh step is to test the relationship between these market structure variables
and contract farming, FPCs or other institutional setting.
2.1.3 Identication
In the demand estimation, the appropriate choice of instrument variables (IVs) is the key
to obtain consistent parameter of i. As textbooks of econometrics often describes price
variables is suered from endgeneity problem because price is determined at an interaction
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between demand and supply. Here, we need to obtain demand parameters by eliminating
supply or cost factors.
We employ the average price of other sales outlets of the same rm. The rationality
and assumption behind this choice is that prices of the same rm at dierent sales outlets
is correlated only with cost factors, not demand factors. As is observed easily, the pork
market is very competitive, and rms can set the price as only cost plus individual market's
demand factors. We assume that a rm cannot aord to set cross-pricing across dierent
sales outlets as competition is very intensive. As described in the following section, this
assumption holds and the IV works ideally. The variables pass the endogeneity test or over
identication test. The partial R square is not low.
2.2 Data
The CAAS conducted a series of pork market surveys in 2008, 2010 and 2015 to docu-
ment the rapid transformation of the industry. The surveys were implemented among hog
slaughtering rms in Henan and Jilin provinces. Wang and Watanabe (2008) summarized
the results of the 2008 survey. This study utilizes 2008, 2010 and 2015 surveys. Between
2008 and 2015, the pork industry in China experienced a big transformation from scat-
tered pig-raising to concentration of big farms. This occurred alongside a hike in wage
costs caused by labor shortage that developed from the mid 2000s, which also resulted in
transformation of the production system. The survey provides a good base for tracing the
transformation process.
2.2.1 Survey Implementation
The rm survey was conducted in two provinces of CAAS in each province from March
to June 2008, November to December 2010, and November to December 2015. In each
province, more than 100 rms were interviewed. The questionnaire was prepared by the
authors of this report in consultation with local statistical ocers as well as livestock experts
in the CAAS. A total of 208 rms in 2008, 208 rms in 2010 and 196 rms in 2015 were
surveyed in Jilin and Henan provinces. The accumulated actual number of rms surveyed
is 516.
The rm questionnaire included detailed questions primarily on the characteristics, -
nance, investment plan, cash management, transactions with nancial institutions, market-
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ing, procurement, and transaction with contract farmers. The questionnaire was drafted
by the authors, pre-tested by local enumerators, checked by the eld supervisor and then
revised in 2008. We nalized the questionnaire according to the results of the pilot surveys
and the feedback from the enumerators.
The rm survey was conducted in Jilin and Henan provinces. These provinces were
chosen because production of porks of these provinces in both ranked high in China. The
interviewed rms were selected by stratied random sampling from the list of rms ob-
tained from the local government statistical oces. Stratied by number of slaughtering,
we interviewed small- medium, and large rms.
2.2.2 Survey Structure
The objective of the survey was to obtain information, such as price, quantity, and other
related transaction issues, of hog slaughtering and processing rms. All pork marketed to
consumers in China follows a very similar procedure set down by the government. Hogs are
bred and produced by farmers, then become pork by slaughtering rms and are then mar-
keted to the consumers. The slaughtering rms are located between farmers and consumers
and are related to entire pork supply chains, thus information from this phase of the process
is ideal for capturing an overview of the pork product chain. In addition, we are interested
in industry transactions with nancial institutions. Surveyed rms were asked to choose one
concrete customers transaction partner among wholesalers, restaurants, supermarkets, and
wet markets, and then from intermediary, contracted farmers, and independent farmers.
After rms made their choices, they were asked to answer a number of questions related
to pricing, quantity, and other transaction conditions with these partners. In addition, the
surveyed rms were asked to provide answers regarding historical transaction records with
nancial institutions and basic information on rms' characteristics.
2.3 Market denition
We set out the prefecture-level city as the boundary of the market in this study. Table 1
lists the names of cities and their basic sizes. Table 2 summarize proles of the markets
sorted by type of sales channel. In this study, thie sales channel is regarded as a source of
dierentiation of products. Among four channels, agents and wet market account for the
larger propotion of sales targets than the other two channels.
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Table 1: Size of Markets Dened (Mean, 2005 to 2010, 2013 to 2015)
Prefecture-level city Pork quantity Population
kg, per transaction 0000
Henan:
Anyang 689,045 592
Hebi 1,794,511 164
Jiaozuo 14,730,941 367
Kaifeng 240,631 542
Luohe 638,535 274
Luoyang 1,410,536 697
Nanyang 581,529 1,177
Pingdingshan 126,144 542
Puyang 2,021,567 414
Sanmenxia 519,613 229
Shangqiu 2,232,040 930
Xinxiang 924,173 673
Xinyang 1,401,237 795
Xuchang 1,479,541 494
Zhengzhou (Provincial capital) 80,249 883
Zhoukou 664,211 1,199
Zhumadian 971,697 894
Jilin:
Baicheng 445,397 201
Baishan 681,366 128
Changchun 3,918,654 756
Jilin 602,293 432
Liaoyuan 64,000 123
Siping 21,205,436 334
Songyuan 455,226 233
Tonghua 78,625 224
Source: CAAS survey for pork quantity. State Statistical Bureau for Population
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Channel mean sd min max N
Agent
Price (RMB/kg) 15.832 4.351 6 28 556
Volume of meat traded 3,476,974.172 26,254,210.934 79 420000000 556
Market share within Channel 0.247 0.328 0 1 556
Established year 1997.724 13.153 1952 2013 532
Henan 0.775 0.418 0 1 556
Jilin 0.225 0.418 0 1 556
Restaurant
Price (RMB/kg) 17.109 4.466 8 32 146
Volume of meat traded 359,090.027 1,108,604.708 120 10,183,252 146
Market share within Channel 0.533 0.408 0 1 146
Established year 1995.750 15.847 1957 2013 136
Henan 0.911 0.286 0 1 146
Jilin 0.089 0.286 0 1 146
Supermarket
Price (RMB/kg) 16.947 4.266 8 29 254
Volume of meat traded 2,080,348.091 22,111,776.525 83 350000000 254
Market share within Channel 0.434 0.401 0 1 254
Established year 1996.296 15.775 1957 2013 240
Henan 0.748 0.435 0 1 254
Jilin 0.252 0.435 0 1 254
Wetmarket
Price (RMB/kg) 15.727 4.483 5 34 672
Volume of meat traded 1,096,606.988 5,809,420.004 84 82,140,000 672
Market share within Channel 0.202 0.315 0 1 672
Established year 1993.464 16.375 1952 2013 649
Henan 0.670 0.471 0.000 1.000 672
Jilin 0.330 0.471 0.000 1.000 672
Total
Price (RMB/kg) 16.077 4.431 5 34 1,628
Volume of meat traded 1,996,899 18,069,590 79 420,000,000 1,628
Market share within channel 0.283 0.360 0 1 1,628
Established year 1995.556 15.305 1952 2013 1,557
Henan 0.740 0.439 0 1 1,628
Jilin 0.260 0.439 0 1 1,628
Source: CAAS survey
9
Figure 1: Transaction Structure of Surveyed Firms: 2010
Source: CAAS survey
Note: \Hotel" includes sales to \Hotel and Restaurants."
3 Estimation Results
3.1 Demand estimates
Estimated demand parameters are presented in Table 3. In these estimates, we regard
dierent sales outlets (indirect sales via agent, and direct sales to restaurant, supermarket
and wet market.). Identication by IV is successful, as the GMM c statistics does not reject
the exogeniety assumption of IVs. Hansen's J statistics does not reject the result as an
appropriate identication, and nor are any of the IVs is exogenous. The partial R square
reached 0.6975, which is a satisfactory level.
As consistency of the parameters was not violated, we can interpret the parameters as a
description of a real market structure. Here, we have three main ndings: (1) dierentiation
of pork products of rms in Henan and Jilin are progressed. Size of consumer surplus of
the buyer (i.e., benet minus price) is in the following ascending order; direct sales to
restaurant, supermarket, wet market and indirect sales via agent. (2) A certain level of
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homogeneity within the each dierentiated cluster is observed. This is implied by nesting
parameters , which is 0.603. This is not low but it is not extremely high. (3) Coecients
of year dummies increased progressively. This implies that the consumer surplus of pork
among the surveyed rms improved over time. Upgrading of pork processing industries is
also observed from other information. We discuss this in the next subsection.
4 Findings on market structure
4.1 Market Upgrading
As mentioned already, market upgrading is dened in this study as increased value of
transacation, that is consumer welfare plus rms' prot. Estimated demand parameters
show the structural parameters of consumer surplus.? Positive and increasing coecients
of year dummies indicate total improvement of consumer surplus took place during the
estimation period3. In addition to positive and increasing coecients of year dummies in
the demand function, development of price elasticity of demand indicate technical progress
and increasing evaluation by the consumer of the industry's products. Own price elasticity
of demand indicates consumers will buy more if the price decreased as revenue of sellers will
increase. This occurs when the price elasticity of demand is higher than 1: the larger the
elasticity is, the more sensitive to price is the demand for products. As summarized in Table
4, the elasticity increased as time passes. It was only 1.1 initially, increased to 2.2 and stay
around 1.5 or higher thereafter. During this period, price hike due to supply-side eect, such
as pig cycles, is observed. However, price elasticity indicates a consumer preference against
price increased. A consistent increase implies that an increase of consumers' evaluation
of products supplied by the industry took place. These results indicate a steady market
upgrading took place in the pork processing industry between 2005 and 2015.
In addition to the year dummies parameter, price elasticity, the estimated size of con-
sumer surpluses, and benets increased. These provide evidences of an upgrading of the
industry.
3This interpretation is an analogy of total factor productivity. Technical progress, which is a factor other
than an increase of input factors, is captured as residuals or year dummies. Market upgrading, an increase
of total consumer surplus attributable to a factor other than price and characteristics of the products can
be interpreted as captured by the year dummies.
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Table 3: Estimates of Demand Function: Jilin and Henan in 2005 to 2010, 2013
to 2015
ln(sproduct)-ln(snotbuy)
Price -0.052**
(0.020)
channel 0.603***
(0.029)
Restaurant -2.258***
(Reference=Agent) (0.132)
Super market -1.452***
(0.101)
Wet market -0.219***
(0.081)
2006 0.270***
(0.097)
2007 0.724***
(0.202)
2008 0.845***
(0.180)
2009 1.085***
(0.161)
2010 0.607***
(0.179)
2013 4.679***
(0.503)
2014 4.903***
(0.399)
2015 4.306***
(0.423)
Constant -5.684***
(1.535)
City dummies Yes
Firm dummies Yes
N 1614
R2 0.862
Partial R2 0.6975
GMM C statistic chi2(1) = -1.4e-13
p = 1
Hansen's J statistics chi2(1) = 4.3e-15
p = 1
Standard errors are in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 4: Market Upgrading
Year Price Elasticity Consumer Surplus Benet Obs
mean per transaction, mean per transaction, mean
2005 1.194 7.878 18.72 251
2006 1.51 8.673 22.3 267
2007 2.291 10.98 31.5 297
2008 1.838 19.21 35.94 237
2009 1.73 19.64 35.87 219
2010 1.854 19.44 36.69 244
2013 1.529 10.37 28.51 81
2014 1.451 17.2 34.42 93
2015 1.708 14.03 33.07 91
Total 1.721 13.97 30.26 1,780
Source: Estimates by authors from CAAS survey
4.2 Value of Transaction by Sales Outlets, and Procurement Sources
Table 5 presents the estimated value of transaction, which was described in equation (1),
estimated benet (B), cost (C), price cost margin (PCM), consumer surplus (CS ) and sur-
veyed price (P). Notable ndings here are as follows. (1) Jilin's median values of transaction
value and benet are higher in all types of sale outlets than their counterparts of Henan,
although the actual average price is almost the same. (2) Restaurants and supermarkets
generate higher values and benets. The price cost margin and rm prot are not lower
than those of other sales outlets. However, the cost of hog, that is the income of farmers, is
observed as no higher than the income of other sales outlets. (3) On the procurement side:
procurement from contractors generates higher value, and benets in Jilin. Organizing own
procurement team generates higher cost of hogs, that is income of farmers. (4) Transactions
with FPCs denitely contributed to raising the value of transaction, benets and prot of
rms. The cost of hogs, that is, the income of farmers, is observed to be lower than that of
non-cooperatives.
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4.3 Geographical Distribution
Geographical distribution might have involved a systematic dierence in utilizing contract
farming or cooperatives. Therefore, we sort price, PCM and cost computed by source of
procurements and by provinces in Table 5.
Indirect procurement via agent has a substantial share of overall procurement in both
Jilin and Henan provinces. The price cost margins from these types of procurement are
around 8.5 RMB for both provinces. There are no big outliers when sorting by cities. On
the other hand, procurement from contract farmers generates higher price cost margins
than the other procurement sources. Comparing Jilin and Henan, Jilin generates higher
PCM from procurement from contract farmers.
Table 5 also shows the median price cost margin between rms who trade with FPCs
and those who do not, and by provinces According to this table, average price cost margins
for rms that utilize FPCs are higher than those who do not for both Jilin and Henan.
Table 6 shows the median price cost margin between rms who procure hogs from
contractor by city. Here, we can observe that a large dierence among cities in terms of
price cost margin, that relies on transaction with contractors.
5 Test: Dierentiated Market and Contract Farming/Cooperatives
This study is interested in whether market upgrading and institutional setting aect the
prots of farmers. The observation of distribution of value in Section 4 implies that contract
farming and cooperatives contribute positively to increase the value of transaction, but the
cost of hog, that is, the income of farmers are maintained at the same level as other types
of procurement source.
Tables 7 and 8 shows the results of the t-test on whether the mean of each groups is
signicantly dierent from each others. Firms that procured hogs from contractors and
own farm generate higher benets and consumer surplus than transaction with agent, own
team and independent rms. Their transaction prices with customers are higher than
independent farmers, but are no higher than that of their counterparts, own farm, own
team and agent. It is noteworthy that the cost of hog, or the purchase price from contractor
farmers is lower than when the farmer sells to the agent or the procurement team organized
by rms. Although the contractor farmers appear to have improved economic value from
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trade, farmers do not actually enjoy increased income.
Table 8 shows a similar t test on the dierence in the mean between rm that trades
with FPCs and those that do not trade with. The results again show a less ideal results:
the estimated cost and price cost margins of hog, the income of farmers who trade via
FPCs, is no higher than for those who do not trade via FPCs, although FPC contributed
to improving the benet, consumer price and price.
6 Conclusion
This study quantied the value of transaction of hog and its distribution among their sales
outlets and procurement partners. The main ndings of this study are as follows. (1)
The pork-processing industry in Henan and Jilin provinces are successful in upgrading the
industry between 2005 and 2010 in terms of the size of welfares provided to society. (2)
Firms that utilized contract farming or FPCs succeeded in upgrading benets and consumer
surpluses, and their own price cost margins. (3) However, farmers, who produced hogs for
processing did not benet from the upgrading of the industry as a whole.
Demand estimation enable us to quantify the distribution of value among rms, farmers
and customers explicitly. This is the main contribution of this study.
We conrmed that contract farming and FPCs contributed to upgrading the economic
value of the industry. In this positive sum environment, it would be feasible to increase
prot distribution to farmers. However, the observations here show the opposite results.
Further study is required to investigate the factors that hinder, such a win-win distribution
relationship between farmers and rms.
A limitation of the current study is as follows. In order to conrm the validity of our
ndings, we need to test the robustness of the estimated cost and price cost margins based
on dierent information. The CAAS survey contains information on actual prices between
farmers and rms, and the attributes of transactions, such as type of meat processing, safety
investigation points, species or size, and feeding days of hogs. Comparing the estimated
procurement prices of hogs with the actual prices would conrm the distribution of the value
between rms and farmers. The attributes of traded hogs between farmers and customers
would yield richer information about which factors aect the distribution of value between
rms, sales outlets and farmers.
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Table 5: Distribution of Value per Transaction: RMB, median
Sales outlets Value Benet CS Price PCM Cost Obs
Henan
Agent 17 23 7.9 16 8.2 6.1 432
Restaurant 20 25 7.9 17 12 3.7 135
Supermarket 19 26 8.2 17 9.8 4.8 189
Wet market 17 24 8.3 16 7.8 6.9 448
Total 18 24 8.2 16 8.2 6.1 1,204
Jilin
Agent 22 30 12 16 8 6 125
Restaurant 62 63 42 16 9 5 13
Super market 28 36 19 16 9 6 64
Wet market 21 28 12 16 8 6 222
Total 22 30 13 16 8 6 424
Procurement source Value Benet CS Price PCM Cost Obs
Henan
Agent 18 25 9 16 9 6 565
Contractor 16 21 4 15 9 5 147
Independentfarme 18 20 5 15 10 5 80
Ownfarm 23 29 10 19 12 4 33
Ownteam 18 26 9 16 8 6 364
Total 19 25 9 16 9 6 1,189
Jilin
Agent 21 29 12 16 8 7 292
Contractor 94 103 86 16 9 6 36
Independentfarme 14 22 6 12 8 3 49
Ownfarm 21 40 29 13 8 3 11
Ownteam 63 104 86 16 8 8 36
Total 22 30 13 16 8 6 424
Cooperative Value Benet CS Price PCM Cost Obs
Henan
No trade with FPC 18 26 8 16 8 7 503
Trade with FPC 25 28 9 18 16 4 108
Total 19 26 9 16 8 7 611
Jilin
No trade with FPC 50 57 42 16 8 8 98
Trade with FPC 95 103 86 16 9 8 13
Total 50 58 42 16 8 8 111
Source: Estimates by authors from CAAS pork processing industry survey
Note (1) Value =benet - cost. Consumer Surplus (CS) = benet - price.
Price Cost Margin (PCM)= price -cost.
Note(2) Cost here is estimated based on the assumption that pork processing rms have sucient
bargaining power with their procurement source to maximize their revenue from the transaction.
If the bargaining power of farmer, procurement sources were large, actual cost would
become would move close to the transaction price. Thus, the actual cost of hogs, that.
is, the income of farmers, is located somewhere between the estimated cost in this
table and the price.
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Table 6: Price Cost Margin (PCM) of Firms that Procures Hogs from Contrac-
tor Most : Median by Cities
City Price Estimated PCM Estimated Cost
Hebi 19.3 19.6 0.4
Kaifeng 15.0 8.0 6.6
Luohe 14.8 21.2 -6.0
Luoyang 16.5 12.0 5.2
Nanyang 12.0 8.2 2.2
Pingdingshan 16.0 10.5 6.4
Puyang 11.0 12.5 -1.5
Shangqiu 16.1 7.7 8.4
Xuchang 13.0 9.3 2.7
Zhengzhou 18.0 7.8 10.0
Zhoukou 19.0 7.7 11.3
Provincial Total 15.0 8.8 5.4
Baishan 20.0 8.2 11.8
Changchun 13.9 14.1 -1.1
Liaoyuan 14.0 12.8 0.7
Siping 16.0 8.5 6.4
Songyuan 22.0 19.7 2.3
Provincial Total 15.9 9.4 5.7
Source: Estimated by authors
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Table 7: T test on Mean Dierences of CS, Benet and Price among Procure-
ment Channels
Benet Agent Contractor Independent F Own farm Own team
Agent 0
Contractor -6.419*** 0
Independent farmer 5.296*** 11.715*** 0
Ownfarm -13.387*** -6.968* -18.683*** 0
Ownteam -2.718** 3.701 -8.014*** 10.669*** 0
CS Agent Contractor Independent F Own farm Own team
Agent 0
Contractor -7.135*** 0
Independent farmer 3.676*** 10.811*** 0
Ownfarm -12.369*** -5.234 -16.045*** 0
Ownteam -2.262** 4.872** -5.938*** 10.107*** 0
Price Agent Contractor Independent F Own farm Own team
Agent 0
Contractor 0.716** 0
Independent faremer 1.620*** 0.905** 0
Ownfarm -1.017 -1.733** -2.638*** 0
Ownteam -0.455 -1.171*** -2.076*** 0.562 0
PCM Agent Contractor Independent F Own farm Own team
Agent 0
Contractor -1.313** 0
Independent farmer -0.590 0.723 0
Ownfarm 3.522 4.835 4.111 0
Ownteam -0.505 0.808 0.085 -4.027 0
Cost Agent Contractor Independent F Own farm Own team
Agent 0
Contractor 2.029*** 0
Independent farmer 2.210*** 0.181 0
Ownfarm -4.539 -6.568 -6.749 0
Ownteam 0.049 -1.979** -2.160** 4.589 0
Standard errors are not displayed, Tested dierences are dened as column-line
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
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Table 8: T test on Mean Dierences of CS, Benet, Price and Cost between
Cooperative/Non-cooperative
Non-nooperative
Benet
Cooperative -6.323**
CS
Cooperative -5.342**
Price
Cooperative -0.981***
PCM
Cooperative -2.591
Cost
Cooperative 1.610
Standard errors are not displayed. Tested dierences are dened as column-line
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
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A Proles of CAAS Survey Results
Discussion: Henan versus Jilin/ 2008 versus 2010 and 2015 Here we focus on
the quality control of products of pork processing rms in Henan and Jilin. We nd a
clear dierence between Henan and Jilin in 2008 to 2010. Between 2008 and 2010, there
was a serious pork shortage due to wage increases and epidemic problems. In this time,
Henan increased reliance on agent-brokers for marketing, and rms conducted quality and
safety inspections by themselves. Firms bore the cost of quality control, while marketing
and procurement functions were outsourced. This might have been motivated in order to
improve the quality of products and maintains costs low as much as possible. In 2015,
there was a big structural change, and a decrease of rm numbers became apparent in the
data. This is reported partly because of market saturation, and partly because of strict
enforcement regarding environmental and food safety regulations.
The dataset has information about each transaction with price, quantity and quality
information. By estimating a dierentiated product demand model, we can observe what
kind of strategy the surveyed rms took so as to tackle the increasing demand for safe and
high quality meat at low prices. This statistical analysis is the next step of this research.
Entry and Exit between 2008, 2010 and 2015 The CAAS conducted repeatedly a
similar survey in 2008, 2010 and 2015, The surveys enabled us to observe the entry and exit
situation in the industry, In 2015, there was a massive exit of small processing rms from
the industry because the government tightened market entry regulations so as to improve
safety and environmental protection level. However, the data indicate that relatively old
rms were still active: 18 per cent all rms appeared in all three surveys, as shown in Table
A.1, On the other hand, there was vigorous entry of rm that entered the market between
2008 and 2009, which was a boom period after pork price hikes.The probability of exits of
rms that entered in this period (7 per cent) was denitely higher than the probability of
rms that entered prior to 2008 (1 per cent) as shown in Table A.3. Between 2010 and
2015, a relatively signicant number of rms entered the market. It is necessary to conrm
whether this vigorous entry and exit of rms improved the benets and welfare that the
industry oers to society, which is tested in the future study.
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Table A.1: Appearances of rms: 2008, 2010, and 2015 surveys
Appearance Number Per cent
Three times: 2008, 2010 and 2015 105 18
Twice: 2008+2010 104 18
Twice: 2008+2015 12 2
Twice: 2010+2015 62 11
Once: 2008 112 19
Once: 2010 91 16
Once: 2015 93 16
Total 579 100
Source: CAAS prok processing industry survey
Table A.2: Appearance of the Survey and Established Period
Appearance Prior to 2008 2008-2009 2010-2015 Unknown Total
Survived through 2008 to 2015 104 1 0 0 105
Twice: 2008+2010 104 0 0 0 104
Twice: 2008+2015 12 0 0 0 12
Twice: 2010+2015 58 4 0 0 62
Once: 2008 110 2 0 0 112
Once: 2010 81 9 1 0 91
Once: 2015 61 9 22 1 93
Total 530 25 23 1 579
Source: CAAS pork processing industry survey
Table A.3: Entry Period of Surviving and Exit Firms in 2015
Year of entry Survived in 2015 Exit in 2015 (Prob of exit) Total
Prior to 2008 530 7 (1.3 %) 537
2008-2009 25 2 (7.4 %) 27
2010-2015 23 0 23
Unknown 1 22 23
Total 579 31 610
Source: CAAS pork processing industry survey
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B Demand Estimation
B.1 Estimation Model of Demand
Here, we develop a model for demand estimation. Consumer demand is modeled using a
discrete-choice formulation. This model describes a process by which a consumer chooses a
product according to the size of his or her utility. On the supply side, we assume competition
between several brands in dierent geographical markets at dierent timings.
B.1.1 Utility and Demand
First, we describe the utility of consumer i which consists of the benet product j. Con-
sumers chose a brand j in a given market (=city and year, here) to maximize their utility.
We view a product as a particular brand sold in a city market m = 1; 2; :::M .(we delete m
hereafter simply for convenience). The indirect utility Uijt of consumer i from purchasing
brand j = 1; 2; :::J at time t = 1; 2; ::::T is,
uijt =  ipjt + Xjt + jt + ijt: (6)
pjt denotes the price of brand j in market m in time t. Other factors aect product
choice, such as the features of product xjt. jt is a product-market specic unobservable. ijt
is the random unobservable error. To predict consumer surplus as appropriately as possible,
we need to capture dierence of elasticity of price for the same product by attributes of
consumers. We need some random coecient of the price. The random coecients of price
in this paper are dened as i = =Yi , whereas Yit is the observed income
4.
The mean utility of product5 j can be rewritten as,
jt =  ipjt + Xjt + jt; (7)
where jt represents unobservable and time specic characteristics. Each consumer i in
market m will chooses product j to maximize his or her utility. Therefore, the aggregate
market share for product j in market m is the probability that product j yields the highest
4We used average income of each city-year segments in this study because we do not have data of
individual income. That means Yi = Ymt =
P
Yi=Imt and i = mt = =Ymt. Imt is the population at
market m and time t in this study. We do not presented it as demand estimates because we could not obtain
a consistent parameters. Instead, we used non-random coecient parameters in this study.
5Because this is the mean of utility, unobserved independent error jt in equation (6) can be regarded as
zero.
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utility across all products including outside goods 0. Therefore, the predicted market share
of product j = 1; ::::J , sj is a function of mean utility jt and parameter vector  =
(; ; 6 ). If the unobserved error, ijt in the equation (6) follows independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) extreme value, this relationship can be rewritten as a logit
choice probability as follows.
Pjt = sjt(jt; )
=
eujtP
k e
ukt
=
e ipjt+Xjt+jt+ijt:
1 +
P
k e
 ipkt+Xkt+kt+ikt (8)
Here, 1 in the denominator in equation (8) represents the value of outside option, be-
cause exp(u0) = exp(0) = 1. The remaining variables in the denominator are the sum of
exponential utilities of all of the choices in every market.
Under this logit assumption, consumer surplus CSi for consumer i, previously indicated
by B   P , takes the following closed format.
E(CSi) =
1
i
E[Max(ujt)] (9)
The expectation is over all possible values of error ijt. Here, expected consumer surplus
for individual i or product j can be written as follows.
E(CSi) =
1
i
ln(
JX
j=1
euijt) + C:7 (10)
E(CSj) =
IX
i=1
1
i
ln(euijt) + C (11)
The absolute value of the consumer surplus is meaningless because of the unknown C.
However, the dierence between several states of consumer surplus as a gure generated
from the structure. This study focuses on the dierence between two dierent agents,
for example, agent h or ownership type h compared to agent k or ownership type k, the
dierence of the sum of consumer surplus of products supplied by rm k and rm h. This
6 is the nesting parameter that explained later referring to equation (15)
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can be written as follows:
CShk = [
J jhX
j=1
1
i
ln(euijt) 
J jhX
j=1
1
i
ln(euijt)] (12)
Once CSj for product j is obtained from the above-mentioned estimates, we can compute
the value of benets of product j; Bjt.
Benefitj = CSj + Pricej (13)
Here, we can observe the relative size of the benets of the product in the same way as
we do for the consumer surplus.
B.1.2 Nested Logit Model and Identication
The logit-based utility model provides an estimating equation of utility in the following
form. Based on the model, we estimate the demand parameters following Berry (1994) and
Nevo (2000) and other BLP literature.
Our estimation equation is,
ln(sjt)  ln(sot) =  ipjt + Xjt + ln(sjtjg) + jt: (14)
Here, we set the outside option as the dierence between population and total number of
air conditioners for an individual market in a year, which represents number of potential
buyer of the products. sjtjg is the share of product j withing group g.
The parameters of this demand can be identied as the previous empirical industrial
organization literatures has claimed (see Ackerberg and Crawford (2009)). Identication
of price parameters, which is critical for our benet computing, relies on the fact that the
unobserved determinants of demand are uncorrelated with input prices. To account for
this potential endogeneity of prices, which may be caused by the presence of changes in
unobserved attributes, we use the GMM estimator with either type of IVs discussed in
Appendix B.2.
To account for the degree of preference correlation between products of the same group,
We imposed a further assumption on the error term, ijt of equation (6).
ijt = igt + ijt (15)
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 is a \nesting parameter" , 0    1 which captures the correlation between preference
and product characteristics. ijt is independently distributed error for consumer, products
and timing.
When demand function parameters are estimated based on the nested logit model,
consumer surplus will be computed as follows (see Ivaldi and Verboven, 2005:677 ?).
E(CSi) =
1
i
ln(1 +
JX
j=1
D1 g ) + C: (16)
Dg =
GgX
k=1
exp(jt=(1  )) (17)
B.2 Instruments
The estimation of the models employed here is typically performed using IV or GMM
using instruments for pjt and nested variables. Instruments zjt are correlated to pjt but
are independent of ijt or ijt . In this case, candidates of instruments here mainly come
from the following four sources: (1) cost shifters. (2) prices of the same products of the
same brand in other cities.( here, we assume that price dierences for the same products
across cities reects only demand factors, and the prices of the same products in other cities
are correlated with price via cost factors only, as per. Berry, Levinson and Pakes, 1995;
Hausman, 1996; Nevo, 2001). (3) price of the same type of products by competitor brands
in the same city (Berry, Levinson and Pakes, 1995), and (4) characteristics of products ( it
is natural to assume that characteristics of products are designed and planned in advance,
before the price is xed.) Exploiting this natural assumption, we use the characteristics of
products as instruments that predetermin the price. Any of four types of instruments were
tried. (i) the rst type of \quality" dummies are sum of index of characteristics within the
own brand. (ii) The second type of this category's IV is sum of the characteristics of other
products of rival rms, and (iii) the third one is sum of the characteristics of other products
of own rms (see Grigolon and Verboven, 2011; Verboven,1996). (iv) The fourth type is the
average index of the characteristics of a competitor.
The Hausman instrument approach (2) relies on the assumption that prices in two dier-
ent markets be correlated via common cost shocks and not via common demand side shocks
such as nationwide demand shock. If a situation occurs such as the market demand of two
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particular market's shrink owing to a common shock between the two particular markets,
the instruments are invalid. However, in our estimation case, this IV works eectively.
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